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The Financial Crisis has hit particularly hard countries like Ireland or Spain. Procyclical 
fiscal policy has contributed to a boom-bust cycle that undermined fiscal positions and 
deepened current account deficits during the boom. We set up an RBC model of a 
small  open  economy,  following  Mendoza  (1991),  and  introduce  the  effect  of  fiscal 
policy decisions that change over the cycle. We calibrate the model on data for Ireland, 
and simulate the effect of different spending policies in response to supply shocks. 
Procyclical fiscal policy distorts intertemporal allocation decisions. Temporary spending 
boosts in booms spur investment, and hence the need for external finance, and so 
generates very volatile cycles in investment and the current account. This economic 
instability  is  also  harmful  for  the steady  state  level  of  output. Our model  is  able  to 
replicate the relation between the degree of cyclicality of fiscal policy, and the volatility 
of consumption, investment and the current account observed in OECD countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Textbook macroeconomics tells us that taxes should be smoothed along the cycle, in order not 
to exacerbate the distortionary effect of taxation, or they suggest adjusting taxes and spending 
in  a  countercyclical  fashion  to  stabilise  income.  Automatic  stabilisers  fulfil  these  functions. 
However,  in  practice governments  do  not reinforce  the  working  of  automatic  stabilisers,  but 
usually overturn them. Instead of dampening cyclical swings in output, governments give an 
additional boost to the economic cycle in a boom with spending hikes or tax cuts, or cool it down 
in  an  economic  crisis  with  contractionary  policies.  Many  OECD  countries  implement  such 
procyclical policies (Lane, 2003; Hercowitz and Strawczynski, 2004; Darby and Mélitz, 2008). 
We argue that such policies have contributed to building up economic imbalances over recent 
years. Public spending has often continued to grow during the economic boom as it was fuelled 
by buoyant tax receipts flowing to the treasury. The surge in tax revenues often triggered tax 
cuts,  with  apparently  little  effect  on  total  revenues.  This  fiscal  relaxation  has  given  an 
excessively strong boost to internal and external demand. Unwinding these imbalances is much 
harder in a crisis, as a shrinking tax base makes tax revenues dwindle, and forces cuts in 
spending at a time fiscal support would be needed most. This reverse mechanism – due to 
efforts to keep deficits in check – further exacerbates the fall in output. 
 
In this paper, we develop a simple RBC model of a small open economy to analyse the effect of 
procyclical  fiscal  policies.  We  model  fiscal  policy  with  a  simple  reaction  function  in  which 
spending reacts to the economic cycle. We then analyse the effect of changes in the degree of 
the cyclical response.
2 These cyclical responses of fiscal policy distort economic decisions, and 
so modify both the business cycle and the long-run equilibrium of the economy. A boost to 
spending  during  a  boom  further  inflates  the  economic  outlook  and  spurs  investment  and  – 
through  the  increased  need  for  external  financing  –  deepens  the  current  account  deficit. 
Procyclical fiscal policy amplifies economic instability, but only to a certain degree. Whenever 
public spending rises by more than output, it crowds out economic activity. As a consequence, 
procyclical policy has a nonlinear effect on economic volatility. A calibration exercise on Ireland 
– a typical small open economy with procyclical policies – shows that consumption is about a 
quarter more volatile than if the government would simply let the automatic stabilisers on the 
spending  side  do  their  work.  As  procyclical  policy  discourages  capital  accumulation,  steady 
state output is lower. 
                                                 
2 A fiscal rule – be it a tax or spending rule – has become common to analyse determinacy of the economy in a 
monetary model (Guo and Lansing, 1998; Christiano and Harrison, 1999; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2000; Aloi et al., 
2003), or to look at the response of the economy to changes in government behaviour (Forni et al., 2009) or to 
technology shocks (Malley et al., 2009).   4 
This paper contributes in several ways to the literature. First, there is substantial evidence that 
large governments display less volatile economies (Galí, 1994, Fatas and Mihov, 2001). Andrès 
et al. (2008) set up an RBC model with nominal rigidities and costs of capital adjustment to 
explain  this  negative  correlation,  which  is  entirely  due  to  a  shift  in  the  composition  of  total 
output. We show that in addition to this composition effect, government size exacerbates the 
effect of cyclical fiscal policy. Our model is able to replicate the relationship between the degree 
of  cyclicality  of  fiscal  policy,  and  the  volatility  of  consumption,  investment  and  the  current 
account observed in OECD countries. Second, our model shows that procylical policies result in 
less economic stabilisation, and as a consequence, in lower steady state output levels. In this 
way,  it  also  establishes  a  link  between  two  empirical  regularities:  (a)  bad  macroeconomic 
policies induce higher macroeconomic volatility (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Woo, 2009), and (b) 
countries with highly volatile output grow at a lower rate (Ramey and Ramey, 1995). 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the evidence on procyclical policies. 
Section 3 presents the RBC model of a small open economy. In Section 4 we introduce the 
spending rule and the results of the calibration. Robustness checks are presented in Section 5. 
We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Some evidence on procyclical fiscal policies 
 
Built-in features of the budget make it respond to the economic cycle. On the spending side, 
these  automatic  stabilisers  include  mainly  unemployment  schemes  that  support  income  for 
some  time,  and  act  as  an  insurance  scheme,  thus  preserving  income  and  providing 
consumption  smoothing  for  credit-constrained  consumers.  We  can  calculate  the  strength  of 
automatic stabilisers by the cyclical elasticity of different budget components. Table 1 (column 1 
to 3) reports these computed elasticities for a sample of OECD countries (Girouard and André, 
2005). The size of the spending elasticities is typically not very large, and varies between -0.23 
(for the Netherlands) and -0.02 (for Iceland). Most of the automatic stabilisation comes from the 
tax  side,  and  this  reflects  the  progressivity  of  most  OECD  countries  tax  schedules.  Overall 
revenues  show  quite  some  variety  in  their  response,  due  to  differences  in  the  underlying 
responses of different tax categories.
3,4 
 
In addition to these automatic stabilisers, the budget responds to economic conditions because 
of  systematic  discretionary  interventions  of  the  government  to  steer  the  economy.  The 
                                                 
3 For example, personal or corporate tax revenues – with a few exceptions – react more than proportionally to the 
economic cycle. Social security contributions do not respond as strongly and their output elasticity ranges from 0.55 
in Japan to 0.91 in the UK. VAT responds in proportion to economic fluctuations. 
4 As a consequence, the elasticity of the primary surplus varies substantially between OECD countries. It is weakest 
in Japan and the US (0.34), but much stronger in countries with an extensive welfare system, like Denmark (0.59).   5 
government may wish to lean against an economic crisis by cutting taxes or raising expenses. 
However,  in  practice governments  do  not reinforce  the  working  of  automatic  stabilisers,  but 
usually overturn them. Instead of dampening cyclical swings in output, governments give an 
additional boost to the economic cycle in a boom with spending hikes or tax cuts, or cool it down 
in an economic crisis with contractionary policies. We can measure the degree of procyclicality 
in spending by looking at the response of government consumption to economic growth. Lane 
(2003) estimates a fiscal rule in which government consumption responds to output. 
 
Table 1. Budget elasticities to the cycle, for spending, taxes and primary surplus. 














Australia  -0.16  0.65  0.39  0.10  0.30 
Austria  -0.08  1.03  0.47  0.14  0.18 
Belgium  -0.14  1.05  0.52  -0.18  0.14 
Canada  -0.12  0.94  0.38  -0.34  0.59 
Denmark  -0.21  1.04  0.59  0.37  0.04 
Finland  -0.18  0.92  0.48  -0.03  0.44 
France  -0.11  0.98  0.53  -0.16  0.33 
Germany  -0.18  0.97  0.51  -0.08  0.40 
Greece  -0.04  1.07  0.47  0.45  -0.07 
Iceland  -0.02  1.01  0.37  0.91  0.17 
Ireland  -0.11  1.14  0.38  0.57  -0.03 
Italy  -0.04  1.17  0.53  -0.14  0.09 
Japan  -0.05  0.97  0.33  0.08  0.10 
Netherlands  -0.23  1.01  0.53  0.40  0.23 
Norway  -0.12  1.00  0.53  0.60  0.73 
New Zealand  -0.15  0.61  0.37  -0.12  0.31 
Portugal  -0.18  1.08  0.46  0.61  0.16 
Spain  -0.11  1.09  0.44  0.68  0.14 
Sweden  -0.15  1.01  0.55  0.13  0.85 
Switzerland  -0.19  1.04  0.37  0.35  - 
UK  -0.05  1.14  0.45  -0.54  0.37 
US  -0.09  1.00  0.34  0.03  0.37 
Notes: data from Lane (2003)(Table 1, p. 2669), and Girouard and André (2005)(Table 9, p. 22); (a) the semi-
elasticity measuring the change of the budget balance as a per cent of GDP, for a one per cent change in GDP. 
 
Table 1 (column 4) reports these estimated budget elasticities. We observe that government 
consumption is procyclical in many countries, and that the difference to the underlying elasticity 
of  spending  (column  1)  is  positive  in  most  cases. We  can  likewise  measure  the  degree  of 
cyclicality of the surplus. Overall, the cyclical response of the surplus also falls short of what we   6 
would expect from the automatic stabilisers in all but a few countries (US, Canada, Sweden and 
Norway)(column  3  and  5).  In  Greece  or  Ireland,  the  deficit  even  increases  when  economic 
conditions improve. The difference is less outspoken than for government spending. The reason 
is that the cyclical response of tax revenues is usually much larger (column 2), so procyclical 
spending does not have much of an effect on the overall elasticity of the (primary) surplus. 
Evidence  for  OECD  countries  shows  that  procyclical  fiscal  policies  are  mostly  driven  by 
government  expenditure  (Lane,  2003;  Hercowitz  and  Strawczynski,  2004;  Darby  and  Mélitz, 




Procyclical policies come at the cost of economic stability. We can see the negative effect of 
procyclical policy on economic stability in Figure 1. We plot the coefficients of column 4 in Table 
1 of the Lane-regressions against the volatility of private consumption and private investment. 
More procyclical budgets are associated with higher volatility in both. We also find a positive 
relationship  between  the  spending  elasticity  and  the  volatility  of  the  current  account.  We 
observe that Ireland can be grouped together with some other small open economies that have 
experienced dramatic falls in the budget balance over the last crisis. Spain, Greece and also 
Portugal  have  run  highly  procyclical  policies,  and  experienced  quite  high  volatility  in 
consumption, investment and the external balance. A simple OLS regression of the volatility 
measure against a constant and the spending elasticity shows that the relationship is significant 
(at 1 per cent) and positive. A plot of other measures of changes in fiscal policy (such as the 
volatility of government consumption, or the difference between 'realised' and 'structural' budget 
elasticities) against the same variables, results in a similar pattern. Woo (2009) provides more 
comprehensive  evidence  for  a  larger  sample  of  countries  on  the  positive  link  between 











                                                 
5 We  would  expect  that  procyclical  policies  stabilise  the  deficit over  the  cycle  at  the  cost  of  economic  stability. 
Taxation is increased – or spending cut – during an economic slump. There is ample evidence that a procyclical fiscal 
relaxation in good times is not offset by a similar procyclical tightening in downturn. Spending goes up during booms, 
but it does not come down in recessions again (Turrini, 2008). Governments loosen the fiscal stance by spending the 
additional tax revenues in good times, but let the balance deteriorate as soon as economic conditions start to worsen 
again (Manasse, 2006, Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2008). Hence, procyclical policy is largely a boom phenomenon. The 
consequence of this asymmetric response over the cycle is a debt bias.   7 
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Notes: coefficients of Table 1 (Lane, 2003), data are from OECD Economic Outlook June 2009. 
 
3. The model 
 
3.1. Building blocks for a model of a small open economy 
 
The model we build is standard, and similar to the small open economy RBC model of Mendoza 
(1991). Readers familiar with that model may want to skip to the next section. The economy is 
inhabited  by  an  infinitely  lived  population  of  unit  density.  Households  share  the  same 
preferences  and  have  to  allocate  consumption  ct  and  labour  supply  ht  intertemporally  to 
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where  β  [ ] 1 , 0 Î   is  the  subjective  discount  rate,  γ>0  is  the  inverse  of  the  elasticity  of 
intertemporal  substitution  in  consumption  and  ω-1  is  the  inverse  of  the  Frisch  elasticity  of 
substitution in labour supply. Households own the perfectly competitive firms and choose every 
period how much to invest (it) in the capital stock kt. In this choice, they are subject to the law of 
motion of capital ( 0 > d  is the depreciation rate of capital kt) 
 
                                                 
6 The adoption of a CES utility function allows us to get steady state conditions that are independent of the initial level 
of wealth or net foreign asset position. 
x y
) 72 . 3 ( ) 02 . 8 ( 84 . 2 46 . 2 + = 38 . 0
2 = R  9 
.                 (2) 
 
We assume that firms incur some adjustment costs in their capital stock when they invest and 
that these costs increase with the speed of the required adjustment, thus making the adjustment 
to the desired level of capital a gradual one. We capture the convex adjustment costs with a 
quadratic function, in which the size of the costs is determined by the parameter f >0:  
 
( )















          (3) 
 
Firms produce a single good that is internationally tradable. Technology is represented by a 
constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas production function 
 
, ) , (
1 a a - = = t t t t t t t h k A k h F A y                 (4) 
 
where  ( ) 1 , 0 Î a  is the capital share in output, ht and kt are, respectively, the amount of labor 
services and capital stock used in production, and  0 > t A  is total factor productivity, which is 
exogenous. Shocks to technology follow an AR(1) stochastic process: 
 
( ) , ln ) ln( , 1 t a t t A A e r + = -    t a, e ~ ( ) a N s , 0 .            (5) 
 
The coefficient ρ is the degree of persistence of the technology shock. Households have acces 
to  an  internationally  traded  one-period  riskless  bond  dt  to  finance  their  consumption  and 
investment choices. The domestic cost of borrowing from abroad is determined by the world 
real  interest  rate  r*,  augmented  by  a  premium  that  depends  on  the  difference  between  the 




t t d p r r + =                   (6) 
 
High levels of borrowing make it more costly to borrow even more. The increasing function ) (× p  
determines this premium on r* so that interest rates are higher (
* > r rt ) if the net foreign asset 
position is higher than in steady state ( d dt > ).
7 We assume the function takes the following 
form (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003): 
 
) 1 ( ) ( - =
-d d
t e d p y                   (7) 
 
The ease with which the portfolio of borrowings can be adjusted in any period is determined by 
the parameter ψ>0. An economy that is more closely integrated in world financial markets will 
                                                 
7This assumption is necessary to obtain stationary wealth in a small open economy (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2004). 
  )  1  (  1  t  t  t  i  k  k  + - = +  d   10 
be  able  to  find  finance  or  lend  abroad  at  a  rate  closer  to  the  world  interest  rate,  i.e.  it  is 
characterised by a lower ψ. 
 
Government spending Gt consists entirely of domestic production and does not provide any 
utility to economic agents. In steady state, the government decides to set Gt at some level G. 
The budget is perfectly balanced by lump sum taxes Tt in every period, so the government does 
not issue debt domestically, nor does it borrow from abroad, so that 
 
t t G T =                     (8) 
 
Production yt can be used to consume, invest, or pay taxes. Since there is only one good in this 
economy  and  goods  and  financial  assets  are  interchangeable,  the  excess  of  domestic 
production over domestic absorption gives rise to trade between the country and the rest of the 
world. The trade balance TBt is therefore defined as:  
 
t t t t t t t T k k i c y TB - - F - - - = + ) ( 1               (9) 
 
A trade balance surplus can be invested in foreign assets (or a shortage financed by borrowing 
abroad) and we so obtain the link between the trade balance and the current account CAt : 
 
( ) . 1 1 1 - - - - = D - = - - = t t t t t t t d r TB NFA d d CA            (10) 
 
At  time  t,  a  country  has  a  net  debt  (credit)  foreign  asset  position  if  dt>0  (dt<0),  and  lends 
(borrows) abroad if CAt>0 (CAt<0). 
 
We consider the social planner solution that maximises (1) subject to constraints (2) to (4) and 
the resource constraint (11) of the economy that is obtained from aggregating the individual 
budget constraint over the entire population: 
 
[ ]. ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 t t t t t t t t t T k k i c y r d d - - F - - - - + = + - -           (11) 
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that is always satisfied if the stock of debt is bounded, as is the case for approximations around 
the non-stochastic steady state. 
   11 
The transmission of a temporary technology – also supply – shock to the economy is standard 
in  an  RBC  model  and  goes  as  follows.
8  A  positive  supply  shock  pushes  up  the  marginal 
productivity  of  capital  and  labour,  and  so  raises  investment.  The  introduction  of  adjustment 
costs  in  the  capital  stock  makes  investment  react  more  gradually.  Hours  worked  go  up  as 
households profit from the temporary higher real wage. As households feel wealthier, they also 
raise consumption. But this rise is smoothed over time as part of the additional income is saved. 
In a closed economy, the investment boom would be financed by giving up consumption. The 
economic expansion is limited due to the rise in interest rates. In contrast, in a small open 
economy, additional financing can be obtained from international markets, and this decouples 
the saving/investment decision.
9 If a positive technology shock produces a strong wealth effect 
on consumption, domestic savings fall short of investment and a current account deficit results. 
The country borrows on international markets, and becomes a net debtor. 
 
3.2. The fiscal rule 
 
In this benchmark model fiscal policy has no particular role to play. Government spending G just 
buys the domestic good, which has no utility, and is financed by a lump sum tax. We depart 
from that specification and introduce a fiscal policy rule. The behaviour of the government is 
modelled with a simple reaction function: spending Gt is initially fixed by the government at the 
steady state level G, but then varies Gt when output deviates from its steady state level (Yss).
10 
In particular, the fiscal rule is:  
 
                  (13) 
 
The parameter θ is the elasticity of government spending with respect to the business cycle. 
The  benchmark  model  comes  out  as  a  special  case  when  θ=0  and  G Gt = .  In  case  θ  is 
negative, spending is cut during an upswing in the cycle, and we call spending countercyclical. 
Instead, if θ is positive, spending is procyclical.
11 A less than proportional reaction of spending 
implies that in case the output gap was 1 per cent, government spending would change by less 
than 1 per cent. We call this a weakly cyclical policy ( [ ] 1 , 0 Î q ). Instead, when fiscal policy is 
strongly cyclical, the response of government spending is more than proportional to the change 
                                                 
8 We discuss the baseline results, and refer to Mendoza (1991) for a more extensive discussion. 
9 The interest rate is set at world level, and the domestic premium only depends on the net creditor position.  
10 Our fiscal rule is defined as a reaction of spending to a change in output (as in Aloi et al., 2003), whereas most 
other papers have considered the reaction to the level of output. 
11 As we consider a balanced budget, the results would be equivalent under a tax rule in which the tax rate responds 
to the cycle. 
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in output  ( ) 1 > q . Although the size of government falls in absolute terms for countercyclical 
policies under a boom and for procyclical policies in a recession, the cyclical behaviour of the 
spending ratio to output is different: in a recession, the spending ratio falls only when fiscal 
policy is strongly procyclical; in a boom, it falls when the government follows any policy but a 
strongly procyclical one. Our terminology therefore encompasses several cases that have been 
considered  in  the  literature  before.  Papers  that  strictly  adhere  to  the  definition  of  a  tax 
smoothing policy consider as countercyclical the policy for which the spending ratio is constant 
over  the  cycle  (θ=1),
12  and  as  procyclical  the  policies  for  which  the  spending  ratio  rises  in 
booms, which holds only for θ>1 (Alesina et al., 2008). Our definition matches the measures of 
the elasticity of government spending to economic growth that have typically been tested in the 
empirical literature (Lane, 2003; Giuliodori and Beetsma, 2008). 
 
3.3. The distortionary and crowding out effect 
 
The  variation  in  government  spending  over  the  cycle  modifies  the  marginal  decisions  of 
households  and  firms.  In  a  standard  RBC  model,  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between 
consumption and leisure equals the wage, which in a competitive labour market equals the 
marginal productivity of labour. The variation in government spending over the cycle drives a 
wedge between these two values.
13 In (14a), the marginal rate of substitution between leisure 
and  consumption  is  no  longer  identical  to  the  marginal  productivity  of  labour 
t h MP ,  but  is 
multiplied by the factor in square brackets: 
 



































q               (14a) 
 
The  same  factor  also  drives  a  wedge  into  the  Euler  equation  (14b)  between  the  optimal 
intertemporal allocation of consumption and savings. When θ=0, this factor is 1, and we are 
back to the benchmark case with acyclical fiscal policy. But whenever fiscal policy varies with 
the cycle (θ≠0), fiscal policy changes the incentives for investment at time t by affecting the 
expected marginal productivity of capital next period. 
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This wedge depends on three terms: the elasticity of spending over the cycle, the output gap 
                                                 
12 Kaminsky et al. (2004) call this policy acyclical instead. 
13 The mechanism described here is similar to the effect of a government expenditure shock in the presence of 
distortionary taxation as described by Baxter and King (1993).   13 
























q                   (15) 
 
The elasticity of spending over the cycle modifies the incentives to invest and consume and 
thereby changes the properties of the business cycle. From the modified first order conditions 
(14a) and (14b), we see that any cyclical policy implies a distortion that changes the incentives 
to work and to invest. The eventual effect on economic stabilization of the fiscal rule depends on 
how the distortion varies over the cycle. We illustrate the mechanism for a positive technology 
shock and a fiscal policy that is countercyclical (θ<0). In a boom phase, the distortion shrinks, 
and decreases the incentive to supply work and to invest. This contrasts the effect of higher 
total  factor  productivity  and  so  cools  down  the  economy.  As  a  result,  consumption  and 
investment increase less after a positive technology shock relative to a neutral fiscal policy. 
Given that domestic saving can finance most of the rise in investment, the current account 
deficit  will  be  smaller.  Countercyclical  fiscal  policies  thus  work  as  a  buffer  against  a 
technological shock as they take the steam out of the boom. 
 
In  contrast,  under  a  procyclical  fiscal  policy,  the  distortion  in  the  boom phase  increases for 
weakly  procyclical  policies  (0<θ<1)  and  shrinks  for  strongly  procyclical  policies  (θ>1). Thus, 
under a weakly procyclical policy, the reverse mechanism is at work. Additional spending in an 
economic boom inflates investment and working prospectives. The increased need for external 
financing reduces the current account surplus (or might even create a current account deficit).  
As a result, weakly procyclical policies amplify the effect of technology shocks and increase 
economic volatility. The opposite is true for strongly procyclical fiscal policies, which lessen the 
effect of technological shocks. 
 
Thus, this distortionary effect is not linear in the degree of cyclicality. The reason is that the 
government spending to GDP ratio varies with θ too. Since there is a single tradable good in 
this economy, and the public good has no direct utility or productive effects, the more resources 
are taken away from the economy for the purchase of the public good, the fewer remain for 
productive activities. The change in spending creates a wealth effect that further modifies the 
economic responses. Take the same example of a positive supply shock and a countercyclical 
policy. The fall in public spending implies a reduction in taxes. This reduction is instantaneous 
as we assume budget balance. Lower taxation produces a positive wealth effect for households. 
They react to it by reducing their labour supply but raising consumption. This curbs incentives to 
invest.  As  savings  fall  relatively  less  than  investment,  the  current  account  moves  upward. 
Although government size (as a ratio to GDP) falls and so frees up additional resources to   14 
employ in private activity, countercyclical fiscal policy always leans against the cycle. In case 
the cut in aggregate demand by the public sector becomes very large – as under a strongly 
countercyclical policy – the fall in public demand does not compensate the increase in demand 
of the private sector, and so curbs economic activity.
14 
 
The mechanism under procyclical policies is not simply the reverse, but depends on the level of 
crowding out of private activity. The behaviour  of the government spending to GDP ratio is 
crucial.  Let  us  consider  first  the  case  in  which  the  government  raises  spending  during  the 
economic boom, but by less than the change in output. This weakly procyclical policy implies 
just a partial crowding out and hence a similar smoothing effect of a reduction in government 
size  as  for  countercyclical  policies.  This  smoothing  effect  gets  weaker  as  the  degree  of 
procyclicality of fiscal policy gets stronger. When θ=1, the government spending ratio does not 
vary after a technology shock, and there is no crowding out of private activity. Once fiscal policy 
is strongly procyclical, government spending increases more than proportionally to output. In 
this  case,  all  additional  output  is  entirely  absorbed  by  public  consumption.  Moreover, 
government spends above the level of output prior to the shock. In this model, this means the 
government buys more of the single tradabe good, and crowds out private activity. Households 
see their disposable income fall, and therefore decide to cut their labor supply and consumption. 
This dampens the economic outlook, and hence firms cut investment too. The current account 
falls as a result. The more proyclical policy is, the more economic activity will be curbed, so that 
it may even offset the positive impact of the additional spending increase on the economy. 
 
We can see the overall effect of a certain type of fiscal policy more formally by taking the first 
derivative of (15) with respect to the output gap: 























































.          (16) 
Equation (16) shows us how the distortionary factor varies along the economic cycle, where its 
sign  depends  on  the  government  spending  elasticity  θ.  To  find  the  overall  dynamic  of  the 
distortion over the cycle as a function of the fiscal rule, we take first derivates of (16) with 
respect to θ: 
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14 As countercyclical policies never raise the size of government but always increase economic stability, there is no 
trade-off between efficiency and stability in this model.   15 
 
We summarise results from (16) and (17) in Figure 2. When the first derivative (16) is positive, 
the  policy  amplifies  the  boom;  when  it  is  negative,  it  dampens  the  cycle.  We  observe  that 
countercyclical policies (θ<0) always reverse the effect of the supply shock. As the degree of 
countercyclicality falls, the distortion shrinks quite rapidly. In contrast, for positive values of θ the 
distortion  first  rises  but  then  falls. Weakly  procyclical  policy  raises  the  distortion  and  hence 
amplifies economic booms. The distortionary effect reaches its peak around θ≈0.50.
15 However, 
for strongly procyclical fiscal rules (θ>1) the distortion decreases again and dampens economic 
fluctuations. 
Figure 2. Evolution of the distortion for different fiscal rules. 
 
Note: the figure is for a spending share Gss /Yss= 0.18, and an output gap Yt/Yss=1.06. 
The model allows us to do some comparative statics. First, all dynamic effects are amplified 
when output fluctuations are stronger. I.e., the more pronounced is the economic cycle, the 
stronger  is  the  impact  of  any  given  distortion.  Second,  the  steady  state  government  size, 
through the spending ratio to output in steady state (
ss Y
G ) ,affects the distortionary factor directly. 
We observe in (15) that a larger government increases the absolute value of the wedge. This 
static  size  effect  amplifies  the  distortionary  effect  of  any  given  type  of  fiscal  policy. 
Consequently, and in contrast to other papers that have examined the size of government in 
                                                 
15 The approximation follows from the second term in (17). 
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values of θ  16 
RBC models (Galí, 1994; Andrès et al., 2008), there is no linear relationship between the size of 
the  public  sector  and  economic  stabilisation.  A  larger  government  is  associated  with  less 
economic volatility only if policy is countercyclical or strongly procyclical. 
 
4. The effects of cyclical fiscal policy 
 
4.1. Calibration of the model 
 
This  DSGE  model  does  not  have  a  closed  form  solution.  We  log-linearise  the  equilibrium 
conditions around the non-stochastic steady state and solve the corresponding discrete time 
rational  expectations  model  by  applying  the  method  by  Schmitt-Grohé  and  Uribe  (2004). 
Preferences, technology and the stochastic error process depend on parameters that must be 
set to some specific values to calibrate the model. The data we use for calibrating the model are 
for Ireland, and based on annual observations over the period 1970-2008. Data are from the 
OECD Economic Outlook no. 86; except data on total factor productivity, which we take from 
the EU KLEMS database. 
 
The selection of parameter values is based on: (a) the restrictions imposed by the model on the 
steady state solution, (b) a match with some stylised facts of the main macroeconomic series of 
the Irish economy, and (c) some external estimates from the relevant empirical literature. We 
check the model findings for their robustness to changes in the main parameters. A first group 
of parameters  ) *, , , , ( d r d b a  is set to values that make the steady state of the model roughly 
consistent with some stylised regularities of the Irish economy. The in sample values are in 
Table 2, panel (a), and the parameters in Table 3. We choose the value of α (capital's share of 
output) as one minus the average of labour compensation over total output: as around two 
thirds of total production goes to labour income, α is 0.32. The real interest rate r* is set to a 
hypothetical  world  real  interest  rate  of  4%.  The  subjective  discount  rate  β  is  set  equal  to 
1/(1+r*). The value of δ (depreciation rate) is set to 0.10, a standard value in the literature. The 
steady state value of government spending (G ) and the net foreign asset position (d ), are set 
to match the average ratio of both series over output. Government spending includes all current 
government spending, but not interest payments on debt. 
A second group of parameters  ( ) y f w s r , , , , a  is set to match the persistence of total factor 
productivity (as a proxy for technology) and the standard deviation of output, investment and 
hours worked. We transform the series to per capita terms, take logs and provide a range for   17 
the statistical moments by detrending with a HP filter with different smoothing parameters.
16 
Panel (b) of Table 2 provides the corresponding values for the standard deviation of the cyclical 
component  of  the  series.
17  To  set  the  value  of  ρ  we  estimate  a  first  order  autoregressive 
stochastic process for the log of total factor productivity (TFP). Given that Ireland has known 
fast economic growth over the period 1989 to 2007, and quickly converged to average EU GDP 
per capita, it is no surprise that the average TFP growth rate is one of the highest in Europe.
18 
Ireland experienced large and repeated positive supply shocks and as a consequence, these 
shocks are quite persistent (ρ=0.80). The value of the standard error of the supply shock σa is 
set to match the standard deviation of output. The imperfections in foreign and domestic capital 
markets – ψ (portfolio adjustment costs) and f  (capital adjustment costs) – usually take small 
values, and are set to match the standard deviation of investment and of the current account 
ratio. The value of ω is set within the range of empirical estimates available in the literature so 
as to match the variance of hours worked in the data. 
 
Table 2. Steady state values. 
  data  model 
            panel (a)                  ratio 
I/Y  0.21  0.22 
G/Y  0.18  0.18 
C/Y  0.59  0.59 
d/Y  0.32  0.33 
     
                   panel (b)          standard deviation 
σY  1.44 - 1.55  1.50 
σI  5.34 - 5.71  5.48 
σh  0.80 - 0.84  0.82 
σCA/Y  1.07 – 1.14  1.07 
Note: series detrended with HP filter, for a range of λ between 6.25 and 8.25. 
 
A final set of parameters is chosen following common practice in the literature. The parameter γ 
(the inverse of the elasticity of substitution) is set equal to 2. Its exact value is hard to estimate 
and  widely  debated,  yet  always  larger than  1  (King  and  Rebelo,  1990).  An  estimate  of the 
elasticity  of  government  spending  to  the  cycle  is  taken  from  Lane  (2003),  and  implies  on 
                                                 
16 We work with annual data and consider an upper and lower bound for the smoothing parameter λ of the HP filter 
(6.25 and 8.25, as in Ravn and Uhlig (2001)). The corresponding cyclical component should match that of a band 
pass filter that selects cycles with a frequency between 1.5 to 8 years.  
17 The use of TPF is based on Solow residuals, which may be criticised as a proxy for productivity shocks, since the 
assumptions underlying the derivation are not satisfied, especially not in a model with adjustment costs. For example, 
Evans (1992) casts doubt on the invariance property of technology; Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) find that a 
variable rate of input utilization reduces the variance of TPF measures. We use alternative detrending techniques for 
deriving technology shocks in Section 5. 
18 TFP has grown annually by 1.22% which is second to Finland only, and double the TFP growth in France or 
Germany over the same period.   18 
average  a  weakly  procyclical  stance  in  Ireland  (θ=0.57).  We  summarise  in  Table  3  all 
parameters we use to calibrate the model. 
 
Table 3. Parameter values. 
parameter     value 
α  capital share of output  0.32 
β  subjective discount rate  0.96 
γ  intertemporal elasticity of substitution  2.00 
δ  depreciation rate  0.10 
ψ  portfolio adjustment cost  0.0011 
ρ  AR(1) technology shock  0.80 
ω  inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labour supply  2.05 
f   capital adjustment costs  0.001 
r*  real interest rate  0.04 
  elasticity of government spending to the output gap  0.57 
 
4.2. The effects on the economic responses to a supply shock 
 
We calibrate the model to see how the distortionary effect of cyclical fiscal policy changes the 
dynamic response of the economy to a supply shock. The main calibration is based on the 
weakly procyclical policy  we observe in Ireland (for θ=0.57), but we then vary θ to analyse 
different counter- and procyclical policies. We plot the responses for five specific values of θ: 
the acyclical policy (θ=0) and two examples - a weak and a strong one – for each type of policy. 
Figure 3a reports the effects on output. As the responses for hours worked and consumption 
are similar to those of output, we have not repeated these. Figure 3b compares the effects on 
investment. 
 
In Figure 3a, we observe how output goes back to baseline as the effect of the supply shock 
gradually dies out. The responses of output under a countercyclical policy lie under those of the 
acyclical policy (θ=0). This effect is economically sizeable as the output response is still lower 
than under an acyclical policy after ten years. The more countercyclical is spending, the more 
the output response is curbed. In contrast, procyclical fiscal policy boosts the output response, 
but only to a certain limit. For the weakly procyclical fiscal policy pursued in Ireland, the impulse 
response to a technology shock lies about ten per cent higher than under an acyclical policy at 
all horizons. But for strongly procyclical policies, the output response is curbed as a result of the 
rise in the government spending ratio. The dampening effect of countercyclical and strongly 
procyclical fiscal policies is also visible from the investment response in Figure 3b. Without fiscal 
policy, a technology shock has positive effects on investment initially, but due to the costs of 
adjustment this response of investment is spread out in later periods. a weakly procyclical policy 
gives  a  supplementary  boost  to  investment,  reflecting  the  distortionary  effect  of  additional 
q  19 
spending. Instead, this investment response is switched – and may even be negative – for very 
countercyclical or procyclical policies, due to the disproportionate change in public purchases. 
 
This dampening effect of a countercyclical or very procyclical policy spills over to the current 
account  (Figure  4).  Under  an  acyclical  fiscal  policy,  the  increase  in  investment  is  nearly 
completely financed by borrowing abroad. As a consequence, the effect on the current account 
is very pronounced. A countercyclical policy smoothes out both investment and consumption, 
hence domestic savings meet to some extent domestic investment needs. Similarly, for strongly 
countercyclical policies, the fall in investment again makes external financing less necessary. 
Savings  can  even  be  sufficient  to  lend  abroad  and  the  current  account  becomes  strongly 
positive  in  the  first  period  already.  Under  a  weakly  procyclical  fiscal  policy  rule,  the 
destabilisation of investment and consumption responses of the economy is magnified. External 
financing  needs  will  rise  even  more,  and  the  current  account  deficit  will  be  much  stronger 
initially.  Recall  that  under  the  parameterisation  of  the  model,  this  is  precisely  the  case  for 
Ireland. This mechanism explains why small open economies might suffer large current account 
deficits when they experience positive supply shock over prolonged periods. 
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Figure 3b. Impulse response function: 1% deviation technology shock, response of investment 
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4.3. The effects on the second moments of the economy 
 
One of the tasks of fiscal policy is economic stabilisation. The degree of cyclicality of fiscal 
policy affects the stabilization properties of the economy. To see this, we compare the second 
periods 
periods   21 
moments of the main series in the model for each possible degree of cyclicality of spending. For 
a given distribution of the technological shock (i.e. Gaussian white noise with a given standard 
deviation), we compute the theoretical second moments of the economy. We then scale the 
variance of the series – for some specific θ – to the variance at the benchmark policy (θ=0.57). 
If the ratio is smaller than 1, that fiscal policy stabilises the particular series more than the 
benchmark policy. On the contrary, if the ratio is larger than 1, we conclude that fiscal policy is 
poorer at stabilization. Figure 5 plots these ratios for different series over the range of possible 
policies. 
 
The first observation on Figure 5 is that the effect on variability is not symmetric over the range 
of  cyclical  policies.  This  is  easily  explained  by  the  dynamics  of  the  wedge  on  marginal 
productivity of capital and labour over the cycle, and the implied distortionary effect of public 
purchases.  Unsurprisingly,  with  countercyclical  fiscal  policy  the  variances  of  output, 
consumption, hours worked and investment are lower than at the benchmark policy. But this 
reduction is not linear in the degree of countercyclicality of spending, and the marginal gain in 
economic  stability  of  adopting  ever  more  countercyclical  policies  is  small.  The  volatility  of 
investment even veers back under such policies. The reason is that the more countercyclical 
the policy, the more it counters the effect of supply shocks. Eventually, a level at which fiscal 
policy reverses the effect of the supply shock is reached. The substitution of private for public 
resources  drains  investment  and  labour  opportunities,  so  dampening  economic  activity.  The 
overall result is an increase in the variability of investment and also of the current account, as 
domestic consumption rises little. As to procyclical policies, weakly procyclical policies amplify 
the effect of the supply shocks on the economy. The variances of consumption and investment 
reach their peak value around θ=0.50, which is the level of cyclicality at which fiscal policy has 
the strongest destabilising impact. Hours worked, and hence output, move slightly more as the 
negative wealth effect of the additional spending kicks in for values above θ=0.50, and then 
decreases rapidly as the distortionary and crowding out effect jointly curb economic activity. 
Strongly  procyclical  fiscal  rules  work  as  a  shock  buffer,  and the  stronger  the  absorption  by 
public goods, the larger the dampening effect. 
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Our model therefore predicts a non-linear relationship between the degree of cyclicality of fiscal 
policy, and the volatility of output and its main components. However, given that the empirical 
estimates of θ in Lane (2003) show no evidence of strongly procyclical policies, there should be 
a linear relationship between the fiscal spending elasticities and economic volatility observed in 
OECD countries. Our Figure 1 shows this to be the case. Further evidence by Woo (2009) 
shows there is indeed a positive link between procyclical policies and macroeconomic volatility.  
 
A  second  observation  on  Figue  5  is  that  the  gain  of  following  countercyclical  policies  is 
potentially large in terms of economic stabilisation. Any fiscal policy that is different from the one 
pursued in Ireland would pay off with more stabilisation.
19 A more procyclical policy would bring 
more stability, but at the cost of more crowding out. There is no such trade-off between stability 
and government absorption for a less procyclical policy. Pursuing an acyclical policy would pay 
off  with  a  20  per  cent  gain  in  output  stability,  a  reduction  of  more  than  ten  per  cent  in 
consumption variability and even up to 30 per cent in hours worked. Implementing a policy that 
let the automatic spending stabilisers work over the cycle could pay off with even more stability 
gains.  Recall  that  the  structural  spending  elasticity  for  Ireland  is  -0.11  according  to  OECD 
figures (André and Girouard, 2005). With such a policy, output stability would increase with an 
additional 5 per cent. 
 
                                                 
19 We do not look into the welfare consequences of increased stability and government size, and so cannot say 
anything on the desirability of one policy over the other without a more specific welfare criterion.   23 
4.4. The effects on the steady state 
 
Cyclical fiscal policy changes the intra- and intertemporal allocation of consumption and saving. 
Countercyclical policies, by inducing a positive wedge on the expected marginal productivity of 
capital and the marginal productivity of labour, increase these values with respect to the case of 
acyclical or procyclical fiscal rules. Consequently, they spur capital accumulation and allow for 
higher long-run values of output, consumption and hours worked.
20 Figure 6 shows that the 
relationship  is  linear.  Unlike  the  non-linear  effect  of  a  higher  government  spending  ratio  on 
economic  stability,  once  government  spending  is  gradually  substituted  for  investment  under 
more countercyclical policies, resources that are relatively more productive than government 
spending are freed up. Consumption and hours worked therefore rise proportionally less than 
investment for more countercyclical policies. As a consequence, a procyclical policy reduces the 
steady state values for output, capital, hours worked, consumption and investment.
21 
 
We can easily see this long-term effect on the steady state in Figure 6 where we plot those 
values for different degrees of cyclicality. We set all variables to 1 under the current procyclical 
policy in Ireland (at θ=0.57). Values above 1 mean that for the fiscal policy corresponding to that 
value  of  θ  the  economy  reaches  a  higher  steady  state.  For the fiscal  policy  we  observe  in 
Ireland, steady state output (or consumption) is about seven per cent lower than under a neutral 
fiscal policy. If automatic stabilisers in the Irish budget were allowed to function fully, output and 
consumption would rise to even higher values. 
 
Figure  5  and  6  have  important  implications  for  the  relationship  between  government  size, 
economic volatility and growth. The model shows why it may be hard to replicate the negative 
relationship between government size and macroeconomic volatility encountered in the data 
(Galí, 1994, Fatas and Mihov, 2001). RBC models have a hard time matching this stylised fact 
and require the introduction of adjustment costs and nominal rigidities to find such a relationship 
(Andrès et al., 2008). In our model, the steady state spending ratio to output rises linearly with 
θ. BUt from figure 5 we know that weakly procyclical fiscal policies, of the kind that have been 
followed by some OECD countries, imply less economic stability and a larger spending to output 
ratio. As a consequence, there is no trade-off between efficiency and stabilisation, as a smaller 
public sector is associated both with a higher steady state level of output and more stabilisation. 
Our model is also able to indirectly replicate the negative relationship between macroeconomic 
volatility and economic growth, as for example in Ramey and Ramey (1995).  
                                                 
20 Micro evidence in Aghion et al. (2009) shows that firms in OECD countries with countercyclical fiscal policy favour 
investment in long-term projects, especially in sectors that rely on stock market or bank financing. 
21 The substitution of consumption and leisure for capital affects households’ utility. We do not look into the tradeoff 
between current and future consumption, and so cannot decide on the optimality of one policy over the other without 
a specific welfare criterion.   24 
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5. Robustness checks 
 
In this Section, we check the interaction between structural reforms, the transmission channel of 
supply  shcok  to  the  economy  and  cyclical  fiscal  policy  with  a  sensitivity  analysis  on  some 
parameters of the model. We find that the choice of a certain fiscal policy matters even more for 
economic stabilisation if the transmission of supply shocks to the economy is stronger. This 
result explains why different EU economies show contrasting responses to economic shocks. It 
also implies an important trade-off for governments in deciding on fiscal policy and structural 
reform measures to facilitate economic adjustment.  
 
The  persistence  of  the  technology  shock  (ρ)  drives  the  propagation  of  the  investment  and 
consumption responses. In the baseline model, we use a value of ρ=0.80, which is based on 
TFP.  Although  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  Ireland  has  experienced  a  string  of 
positive supply shocks over the last two decades, alternative detrending methods usually give a 
somewhat lower degree of persistence. We summarise the information for different values of ρ, 
by providing the second moments of all series, scaled to the variance of output. The benchmark 
in all cases is the weakly procyclical policy in Ireland (at θ=0.57). Table 4 shows that hours 
worked  undergo  little  variation  with  varying  persistence  of  the  supply  shock.  However, 
investment  and  consumption  are  strongly  affected,  and  hence  the  response  of  the  current 
account  is  modified  too.  A  more  persistent  shock  raises  the  wealth  effect  of  technological   25 
shocks on consumption, and also increases capital accumulation over a longer period of time. 
The investment boom induces agents to borrow more on international financial markets at the 
start, as consumption rises strongly too. Although this creates a current account deficit initially, 
savings gradually rise over time, eventually turning the country into a large net creditor.
22 This 
explains  the  more  moderate  increase  in  the  volatility  of  the  current  account  ratio.  At  lower 
degrees  of  persistence,  investment  and  saving  decisions  are  not  decoupled  as  much  as  a 
temporary boom does not allow for strong responses of consumption. Domestic savings are 
more than sufficient to finance investment, and so the current account may show a surplus 
(even on impact). 
 
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis: persistence of the supply shock (for θ=0.57) 
  ρ = 0.10  ρ = 0.40  ρ = 0.60  ρ = 0.80  ρ = 0.99  data 
σI/σY  1.78  3.91  4.31  3.66  1.50  3.67 – 3.70 
σC/σY  0.90  0.99  1.02  1.08  1.15  1.38 – 1.39 
σH/σY  0.53  0.54  0.54  0.55  0.57  0.54 – 0.55 
σCA/Y  0.13  0.41  0.70  1.07  1.83  1.07 – 1.14 
 
The impact on consumption or investment is modified for varying degrees of cyclicality of fiscal 
policy, but mostly goes in the same direction as the baseline model. In contrast, the effect of 
supply  shocks  on  the  current  account  is  not  linear.  Figure  7  plots  the  ten  year  cumulative 
response of the current account to a supply shock for different θ. In order to assess the overall 
impact, we cumulate the absolute values of the response in very period as the initial effect of 
the investment boom on the balance would otherwise neutralise the later effect of increased 
domestic savings. 
 
Procyclical policies magnify the response as they give an additional boost to investment, and 
this  mechanism gets magnified for more  persistent shocks. Only  for  very  temporary  shocks 
does investment never rise enough to offset the increase in domestic savings, and so has little 
impact  on  the  external  balance.  The  inverted  U-shape  for  the  countercyclical  and  strongly 
procyclical  policies  is  due  to  the  effect  of  a  higher  government  spending  ratio  that  cuts 
investment, and makes domestic savings flow abroad. 
 
Figure 7. Persistence of supply shock, ten year impact response on current account ratio. 
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The effects of the type of fiscal policy on the business cycle property of the model depend as 
much on the persistence as on the transmission of the supply shock to the economy. Let us 
consider labour markets first. In the model, a more rigid labour market moderates the response 
of hours worked to a supply shock. Due to the limited reaction of labour supply, investment 
needs to adjust relatively more, making it more volatile. The dampening effect on consumption 
frees savings to finance investment and this offsets the possible rise in the variance of the 
current account. We measure labour market flexibility by ω. Variations in ω – where a higher ω 
corresponds  to  less  flexible  labour  markets  –  could  give  reasonable  descriptions  for  other 
economies. Spain is a good example as it also ran a (weakly) procyclical fiscal policy. Table 1 
shows that the elasticity of government spending is even higher than in Ireland (θ=0.68). But 
unlike Ireland, the Spanish labour market is very rigid. If Ireland had a rigid labour market like 
Spain, there would be less variation in hours worked, and hence fewer changes in consumption. 
The volatility of the current account would also have been lower. The last two columns compare 
the second moments for Spain and Ireland, and the data seem to support the lower predicted 
volatilities. Figure 8 shows that the response of the current account ratio decreases with higher 
ω.  This  figure  also  tells  us  that  if  Ireland  would  make  more  flexible  its  labour  markets,  a 
contemporaneous effort to make fiscal policy more countercyclical would mitigate – albeit not 
fully eliminate – the impact on the current account. 
 
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis: flexible labour markets (for θ=0.57) 
  ω = 1.30  ω = 1.50  ω = 2.05  ω = 3.00  ω = 4.00  data Ireland  data Spain 
σI/σY  2.01  2.81  3.66  3.91  3.97  3.67 – 3.70  3.42 – 3.43 
σC/σY  1.09  1.11  1.08  1.04  1.02  1.38 – 1.39  0.97 – 0.99   27 
σH/σY  0.88  0.78  0.55  0.36  0.27  0.54 – 0.55  0.30 – 0.32 
σCA/Y  2.41  1.69  1.07  0.81  0.72  1.07 – 1.14  0.89 – 1.00 
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Ireland is a small open economy and is well integrated into capital markets, so it may tap easily 
from  international  financial  markets.  The  introduction  of  the  euro  has  likely  improved  the 
functioning of the Irish financial market, and its integration with the euro market. We can mimic 
the effect of increasing integration with a reduction in the premium on interest rates (lower ψ), 
and the effect of more efficient financial markets with a fall in capital adjustment costs (lower f ). 
The effects are rather similar for each parameter, so we report results for the latter only. As we 
would expect, a more favourable environment for investment increases its variability and also 
that of the current account ratio, as can be seen from Table 6. The capital stock can now be 
adjusted  more  quickly,  hence  investment  booms  become  more  pronounced  and  so  are  the 
needs  for  financing  on  international  capital  markets.  The  effect  of  more  efficient  financial 
markets on the labour market is not important, but there is a fall in the volatility of consumption. 
Instead, for very high adjustment costs, the financing channel is cut off and investment cannot 
be  easily  converted.  In  this  case,  investment  can  hardly  respond  to  the  supply  shock  and 
domestic saving supplies for the financing needs of firms. 
 
Table 6. Sensitivity analysis: cost of adjustment of capital (for θ=0.57) 
  = 0.001365  = 0.00273  = 0.01365  = 0.0273  = 0.1365  data 
σI/σY  4.84  4.62  3.66  3.12  1.98  3.67 – 3.70 
σC/σY  1.04  1.05  1.08  1.10  1.19  1.38 – 1.39 
σH/σY  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.55  0.57  0.54 – 0.55 
σCA/Y  1.58  1.48  1.07  0.84  0.35  1.07 – 1.14 
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The change in the response of the current account ratio to a technology shock can be observed 
in Figure 9. As the adjustment cost of capital decreases, the cumulative response of the current 
account ratio for the benchmark rule increases. This suggests that a country like Ireland, before 
its integration into the EU, could maintain procyclical fiscal policies without suffering from large 
external imbalances.  
 
The bottom-line of these robustness checks is that the gain in economic stability from adopting 
a weakly countercyclical policy increases with the strength of the transmission mechanism of a 
supply  shock.  Moreover,  independently  of  the  characteristics  of  the  economy,  a  weakly 
countercyclical  fiscal  rule  is  more  likely  to  outperform  a  procyclical  policy  in  terms  of  the 
response of the current account. The cost of procyclical policies is larger after reforms that 
make labour or financial markets more efficient. Ireland became especially prone to suffer high 
current account deficits, and strong investment booms, by keeping its fiscal policy procyclical 




This paper presents a model that shows why some small open economies, like Ireland or Spain, 
which pursued procyclical fiscal policies, have suffered such wide swings between economic 
boom and bust. We include a fiscal rule that let spending vary with the cycle in a simple RBC 
model of a small open economy. We calibrate the model on data for Ireland, and simulate the 
effect of different spending policies in response to economic shocks. The main finding is that   29 
procyclical fiscal policy fuels the economic cycle, inflates investment and deepens the current 
account deficit, and so rolls the economy into wide boom-bust cycles. Countercyclical spending 
instead  dampens  the  cycle.  Consumption  is  about  a  quarter  more  volatile  than  if  the 
government would simply let the automatic stabilisers on the spending side do their work. Such 
a procyclical policy also discourages the accumulation of capital, and so reduces the level of 
output in the longer term. The long-term economic cost for Ireland of keeping policy procyclical 
is about 7 per cent of GDP. These numbers are especially high as the economic transmission 
mechanism in Ireland exacerbates the effects of procyclical fiscal policy. EU membership has 
raised prospects of economic convergence in the last two decades. Labour markets are quite 
flexible, and the economy is very much integrated in international financial markets, especially 
since  its  participation  in  EMU.  Sorting  out  the  economic  crisis  in  Ireland  may  require  fiscal 
adjustment in the short term, but the long-term goal should be to reduce the distortions in policy. 
 
Our model replicates the positive relationship between the degree of cyclicality of fiscal policy, 
and the volatility of consumption, investment and the current account that we detect in OECD 
countries. The model also establishes a link between a specific distortion to policy, probably 
rooted in political institutions, to macroeconomic volatility and economic growth for which there 
is also empirical support (Acemoglu et al., 2003; Woo, 2009). Some additional features could 
bring the model even closer to reality. First, the present model is a conservative estimate of the 
negative effect of procyclical policy. Fiscal policy is greatly simplified as spending is financed 
with  lump  sum  taxes  only.  Distortionary  taxation  worsens  the  negative  effects  on  economic 
volatility and growth (Andrès and Domenech, 2006). A model with distortionary taxation would 
allow  evaluating  the  quantitatively  more  important  automatic  tax  stabilisers.  Second,  in  our 
model, we suppose budget balance. Debt finance in contrast would allow smoothing the cyclical 
adjustment, and minimise the distortions of taxation over time. Third, automatic stabilisers are 
more  effective  in  response  to  demand  than  to  supply  shocks.  An  RBC  model  with  nominal 
rigidities  could  therefore  generate  even  larger  economic  gains  from  countercyclical  policy 
(Malley et al., 2009).   30 
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